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12. A merger in the insurance industry: much
easier to measure unilateral effects than
expected
Christian Gollier and Marc Ivaldi
1. Introduction1
This Chapter reports an econometric analysis conducted for a real case, but the
identities of the firms have been suppressed for confidentiality reasons. The
merger was eventually approved by the relevant national authority. The study is
aimed at providing a measure of unilateral effects of the proposed acquisition of
A by B on an insurance market in a national market in Europe by means of an
econometric model. In other words, it provides a measure of the impact of this
notified merger on the insurance price and the consumer surplus. It is expected
that the preservation of competition on insurance markets makes insurance
premia closer to the actuarial values of the risk transfers, therefore improving
the insurability of individual risks and their diversification through mutualisa-
tion. This yields a direct welfare gain due to the risk aversion of consumers. But
insurability is also favourable to economic growth by disentangling investment
decisions from risk aversion. The aim of this study is to determine whether the
planned merger could jeopardise those collective benefits. This requires us to
examine the recent evidence on prices, costs and market shares in order to
estimate how much competition would be taken out by the merger and how
competition would remain from continuing rivals.
The econometric model describing the functioning of the non-life insur-
ance markets is based on several facts which are drawn from a descriptive
analysis. First, for most segments of the market, mainly those concerning the
individual consumer, it is observed that market shares are correlated among
different lines of insurance. Consequently, what really matters is the strategy
of each insurance firm taken as a whole, rather than in narrowly defined
1 The authors acted as advisors to the competition authority.
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markets. Second, with respect to potential antitrust concerns, whatmatters is the
decision of consumers to choose among insurers based on their average com-
mercial offering; inasmuch as insurers are applying second-order price discri-
mination should affect the analysis marginally. Third, differentiation in this
market is significant, in particular the risk level, as measured by the loss ratio,
i.e. the ratio of the number of claims to the number of policies, varies among
insurance firms. Fourth, after having experienced a wave of mergers before
2000, this insurance industry has since experienced a more stable situation.
The model is built to account for these facts. It is based on the recent
literature on the econometrics of differentiated-products markets. It com-
prises a logit model to represent consumer choice and to explain market
shares measured in terms of the number of policies, a Bertrand–Nash pricing
equation to explain the average premium and a cost function that serves to
obtain a measure of marginal costs from the observation of total claims and
administrative costs. The model is estimated on an annual data set over the
period 2000–3. The number of policies for each firm includes all insurance
contracts on personal accidents and travel, fire and other damage to property,
motor vehicle liability and general liability, because these insurance segments
represent 90 per cent of the market and because data associated with these
segments are more reliable. Thirteen insurance groups (firms) are represented
in the data set on the period of estimation.
The model serves as a tool to simulate the merger. If all customers of A and
B stay with their insurers after themerger and if competitors do not react, then
one predicts a very high price. It is not a sustainable situation. One reasonably
expects that some customers of B and A could move to other insurance
companies and that they might change their pricing strategy. Hence it is
required to simulate the new equilibrium after merger, as if all customers
re-compute the optimal choice of insurance. This can be achieved using our
estimated own- and cross-price elasticities and marginal costs.
Section 2 provides a descriptive analysis of the industry and section 3 sets
out the model and its estimation. Section 4 simulates the merger and section 5
concludes.
2. Descriptive analysis
Annual panel data are available for the period 1990–2003. They concern all
insurance companies present on the market and all segments of the market.
For each year, firm and segment, data is available on the following variables:
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total amount of claims, administrative costs, total amount of premia and
number of policies. The amount of missing data is relatively small. In addition,
for some segments (employers’ liability, fire and other damage to property,
motor vehicle liability, and general liability) the number of accidents is available.
A descriptive analysis allows us to stylise five important facts that are useful
to understand the working of the insurance market.
2.1 Correlation among insurance segments and their relative weights
First we can report on the market shares of insurance groups computed in
terms of number of policies for the whole market and for different segments of
market over the period 2000–3. The merger concerns the first two groups,
each representing slightly more than 20 per cent of the whole market.2 It
would provide to the combined entity a much larger market share than the
other groups present on the market since the largest followers have market
shares around 10 per cent of the whole market.
The descriptive analysis mainly shows that the market shares of each group
in the different market segments are similar. We do not observe a group
having a strong position in one segment and having no activity in another
segment. The ranking among groups is almost identical from one segment to
another. There is clearly a strong correlation between the market shares in
each segment and the overall market shares. It is confirmed by Figure 12.1,
where the market shares of groups in the fire and motor insurance segments
are displayed together with their overall market shares.
Figure 12.2 shows that the shares of different insurance market segments
are stable over time and four segments – personal and travel, fire, motor,
general liability – together represent almost 80 per cent of the total number of
policies. Given that the demand for insurance by business customers is more
complex to estimate, setting aside the other segments – in particular employ-
er’s liability – should not involve a large distortion in the statistical results. For
this reason, the econometric model below bears on the total number of
policies for these four types of insurance. This solution avoids treating the
question of policies for business groups. The analysis will therefore be made as
if insurers offer an ‘umbrella policy’ covering these four insurance lines at
the same time. The economic theory of insurance provides some arguments
for why providing this bundling of contracts is optimal for policy holders.
2 For confidentiality reasons, the ordering of firms is changed from one graph (or table) to the other. What
it is important here is to compare firms.
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Figure 12.2 Distribution of insurance segments (by number of policies)
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Figure 12.1 Market shares: motor and fire insurance segments vs overall insurance market
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Without asymmetric information, an umbrella policy is an optimal risk-sharing
arrangement. (See Arrow, 1971; Gollier and Schlesinger, 1995.) Under asym-
metric information, bundling risks can alleviate the adverse selection problem
when the various individual risks are correlated.
2.2 Correlation between number of policies and amount of premia
A standard problem in the measurement of market shares in insurance is
related to the definition of the unit of service. Two methods can be used that
are based respectively on the number of policies sold, or on the aggregate
premium. Neither of them is completely satisfactory. However, Figure 12.3
shows that there is a strong correlation of market shares of insurance groups
whether they are computed with respect to the number of policies or with
respect to the total amounts of premia collected. Figure 12.4 also shows that the
distribution among segments is not modified when this distribution is based on
the amounts of premia instead of the numbers of policies as in Figure 12.2.
Together with the facts described in section 2.1, it appears that what really
matters is the strategy of each insurance firm taken as a whole. With respect to
potential antitrust concerns, what matters is the decision of consumers to
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Figure 12.3 Market shares in terms of number of policies versus total amount of premia
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choose among insurers based on their global commercial offering, averaged
across the different lines of insurance, that insurers are applying second-order
price discrimination should not affect the analysis.3 In other words, what
matters is the decision to enter in a relationship with an insurer based on the
average price of its bundle of insurance contracts, i.e. the premium of its
virtual ‘umbrella policy’.4
2.3 Average prices are not rising and margins are fair
Figure 12.5 exhibits the temporal pattern of average premia for some insur-
ance groups and for the insurance industry as a whole. Note that the average
premium of B is below the industry average although B’s premium rises while
A’s decreases. Note that the temporal pattern of the average premium for each
firm is relatively unstable, which is also a sign of a very active market. The
industry average premium has a slight negative trend on this period which
could be interpreted as a sign of competition in the industry.
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Figure 12.4 Distribution of insurance segments (by amount of premia)
3 In this context, second-order price discrimination refers to cases where a firm does not have precise
information about the preferences of individual customers but it can use menus of contracts in order to
extract the relevant information from its customers.
4 Often customers buy all their insurance contracts from the same firm.
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However, a change in the aggregate premium collected can originate from a
reduction of the insured risks rather than from more effective competition
between insurers. Therefore, it is better to examine commercial margins (see
Figure 12.6). The commercial margin is computed as the ratio of total premia to
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Figure 12.5 Average insurance premium (personal, motor, fire, general liability)
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Figure 12.6 Average commercial margin (personal, motor, fire, general liability)
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total costs (i.e. the sum of total claims, administrative and acquisition costs) so the
break-even reference point is one. Note that B is about to break even, in the sense
that its average premium paid by its customers just covers the cost of their
accidents. This ratio is an indicator of profitability of the sector. This profitability
takes into account two important components of the balance sheet of insurance
companies. First, selling insurance generates administrative and acquisition costs
(including selection costs, monitoring costs and auditing costs) that are usually
estimated to equal between 20 per cent and 30 per cent of the insurance premium
in the non-life sector. Second, because of the inversion of the production cycle in
this sector (i.e. premiums come in before claims go out), insurers can invest
insurance premia on financial markets before paying indemnities to policy
holders who have incurred an insured loss. This activity yields a return that
must be taken into account to measure the overall efficiency of insurance com-
panies. In the absence of information about the return of the financial reserves of
the various insurance companies, it is not easy to inferwhether the evolutionof the
technical results observed on Figure 12.6 comes from increased competition or
from other factors, such as changes in anticipated returns on insurance reserves.
This ratio is also a good indicator of the insurability of risks in the economy.
When it is close to unity, insurance premia are actuarially fair. This induces
risk-averse households to purchase full insurance. This complete transfer of
individual risks to insurers is efficient from the viewpoint of risk diversifica-
tion. Insurance companies and mutuals wash away uncorrelated individual
risks either by pooling in a mutual or by the transfer to financial markets in a
shareholding insurance company. A loss ratio around unity is also useful for
the growth of the economy, because the efficient risk transfer that it yields
allows for disentangling investment decisions from risk aversion, both at the
individual level and at the level of firms. Figure 12.6 reveals that this objective
is approximately fulfilled by the insurance markets.
2.4 Insurance firms are differentiated in terms of risk level
Firms attempt to diversify their commercial strategies. There is an objective
reason for this behaviour. In Figure 12.7, it is noticeable that the firms are
differentiated in terms of their average risk level, measured by the frequency of
accidents, as measured itself by the ratio of the number of claims divided by
the number of policies. Note that B and A are among the firms having the
lowest risk level. It is fair to say that the reason for their relatively low risk level
should be related to the combined effects of their seniority and their large
presence on the insurance market.
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2.5 The structure of the insurance sector is stable since 2000
Finally Table 12.1 shows that, after having experienced a wave of mergers and
consolidation before and during 1999, the industry remains relatively stable
both in terms of average market share and number of active firms. The
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Figure 12.7 Annual claim frequency per firm
Table 12.1 Statistics on the industry structure
All firms
Firms having a market share
higher than 1%
Maximum Mean # firms Mean # firms
1996 15% 4% 27 4% 15
1997 16% 4% 25 4% 16
1998 14% 4% 28 4% 16
1999 15% 4% 27 4% 16
2000 26% 5% 22 5% 12
2001 28% 5% 21 5% 13
2002 27% 5% 20 5% 14
2003 28% 6% 18 6% 12
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stability of the industry structure since 2000 invites us to fit the model only on
the data covering the period 2000–3.
3. Empirical analysis
An econometric model of the insurance market is specified and estimated on
the basis of available data and facts derived in the preceding section. This
model is a particular case of a wider class of models that are used in econo-
metrics of differentiated product markets to evaluate the impact of mergers.
3.1 Specification of the econometric model
The model comprises three main ingredients: a demand model to describe the
choice of insurance by individual consumers, a cost model to approximate
how claims are affected by the activity level of firms and a pricing behaviour
that describes the conduct of firms in Bertrand-Nash competition.
Demand
The theory of insurance demand has been developed by Mossin (1968). Its
main result is that full insurance is optimal only if insurance premia are
actuarially fair. However, because insurers must cover their administrative
costs, insurance premia entail a positive loading factor. This induces house-
holds to optimally retain some of their risks. This can be done either by some
coinsurance clauses (deductibles, caps on indemnities) or by leaving some
of their risks uninsured. Under some weak assumptions on preferences, the
insurance demand is decreasing in the premium rate, i.e. in the insurance
price. Moreover, the demand for insurance is decreasing with wealth. Because
of the cost incurred by switching insurer, it may be optimal for policyholders
to stay with an inefficient insurer, as long as the inefficiency index does not
exceed some small threshold. These switching costs may have a positive effect
on the efficiency of insurance markets. Indeed, they imply some degree of
loyalty of the policy holders to their insurer, which is beneficial for long-term
risk sharing. These switching costs imply also that the demand addressed to
each individual company is not completely elastic and that competition is
imperfect. An important goal of this study is to examine these cross-price
elasticities of insurance demand.
These ingredients are introduced in our econometric model in the follow-
ing way. The preference structure of a representative consumer is represented
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by means of a logit model. (See Werden, Froeb and Tardiff, 1996, or Motta,
2004.) Here the consumer chooses between I different insurance groups.
There is an additional choice, called the outside option, which is referred by
index 0 in the sequel. This choice consists in buying insurance from a set of
very small firms representing less than 3 per cent of the market all together or
in buying no insurance at all. So there are I+ 1 choices (see Figure 12.8). Each
choice, indexed by i, is described by a utility index which itself depends on
three components: the price, pi, a quality index, δi, and a random term ui. First,
the price is measured by the average premium. The sensitivity of the quality
index to prices is driven by a parameter, that we call the marginal utility of
income, denoted by α. This parameter is assumed to be function of gross
domestic product (GDP) to account for the increase in wealth from one year
to the other. Second, the quality index depends on a set of factors, xi, namely
the accessibility to the insurer (measured by the number of offices5), the
reputation of this insurer (measured by its risk level observed by the consumer
one period in advance) and a fixed effect which, among many possible effects,
measures the loyalty of consumers to their insurer. Third, the random com-
ponent combines all variables that are not observable by the analyst and play a
role in the consumer choices.
In this context, the choice probabilities aremeasured in terms ofmarket shares.
Indeed, the market share of a product is the observed value of the probability that
a representative consumer chooses this particular product. The market share of
the insurance firm i, si, is obtained as the ratio of the number of policies held by
the insurance firm i, namely yi, over the market size, Y, that is to say:
Insurance X …. …. Insurance Y …. Outside option
Figure 12.8 Consumer choice
5 The number of offices is not necessarily the best proxy for accessibility. The number of agents or brokers
was not available for all insurance companies on a systematic basis.
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Si ¼ yi
Y
¼ yi
PI
i¼0
yi
: (1)
The number of policies associated with the outside alternative, y0, is approxi-
mated by the number of policies held by the set of small firms. It can be
enlarged arbitrarily if one believes that the market size is larger and should
take into account all potential customers having no coverage.6
Mathematically, by using the logit model, one can write the logarithm of the
market share si for insurance firm i as:
lnðsiÞ  lnðs0Þ ¼ i  pi þ ui; (2)
where s0 is the market share of the outside alternative. Moreover, we specify
that
 ¼ 0 þ 1GDP; (3)
and
i ¼ xi; (4)
where α0, α1 and the βs are parameters to be estimated. We refer to δi as the
‘quality index’ for each firm. For the sake of completeness, we apply the usual
normalisation that the mean utility of the outside alternative, i= 0, is zero.
Cost
The insurance activity entails many sources of costs linked to the fight against
adverse selection and moral hazard. Because individual risks are heteroge-
neous, it is essential for insurers to establish an efficient marketingmechanism
to select the individual risks that they will accept to insure. The complexity of
evaluating these risks on the basis of their observable characteristics may
explain the large acquisition costs in the non-life insurance sector. Different
companies have developed different marketing strategies, either with inde-
pendent brokers, with local branches or offices, with bancassurance, or using
new information technologies (internet, call centres). In addition to these
acquisition and selection costs, the existence of an ex-ante moral hazard
problem in insurance requires that insurers monitor the efforts of the policy
holders to prevent risks to occur, generating monitoring costs (see Arrow,
6 The consequences of enlarging the market share of the outside good is to increase the competitive
pressure on the inside firms.
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1971). Finally, because insured losses may be difficult to observe, there is an
ex-post moral hazard problem (insurance fraud). This implies that insurers
must invest in sophisticated technologies to audit claims. Selection costs,
monitoring costs and auditing costs are estimated to be as large as 20–30
per cent of the insurance premium paid by the policy holder.
In this type of model, it is usual to assume constant marginal costs, i.e. the
cost of selling one more policy is assumed to be independent of the size of the
company. Here we propose to approximate marginal costs by means of a cost
function. First, the assumption of constant marginal costs is unrealistic given
what we just explain. Second this assumption involves the estimation of one
parameter – the marginal cost – for each firm. This is not ideal when the
number of degrees of freedom remains limited as here. Third, estimating a
cost function allows us to internalise the question of potential efficiency gains
due to a merger within the equilibrium model of the industry.
We assume that, over the estimation period (2000–3), most input factors
are fixed and are a function of the number of offices that corresponds to the
size of the network. If Ci is the total cost of insurance firm i as measured by the
sum of total claims and administration costs, if ki is the number of offices held
by this firm, then we assume that
Ci ¼ 0 þ 1yi þ 2yiki þ wi; (5)
wherewi is a random term representing measurement errors and γ0, γ1, and γ2
are parameters to be estimated. The expectation is that the marginal cost of an
additional policy is lower if the group has a larger network of offices, so γ2< 0.
This simple linear model for the cost provides an excellent fit and permits to
approximate the marginal cost, ci, as
ci ¼ 1 þ 2ki þ !i; (6)
where ωi is a random term representing unobserved shocks to marginal costs.
Pricing
Firms adopt a Nash behaviour: they choose the prices of their products to
maximise profits, given the prices set by the other firms. In maximising its
profit πi defined as
pi ¼ piyi  Ci; (7)
each firm trades off two effects when considering an increase in price by one
unit: (i) it increases profits proportional to the current sales level of the firm,
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(ii) it reduces sales, which lowers profits proportional to the current markup.
When the demand is specified as above, this trade-off is summarised by the
pricing equation:
pi  ci
pi
¼ 1
pi 1 sið Þ (8)
This equation states that the price-cost margin (i.e. the Lerner index) of firm i
must be set equal to the inverse of the absolute value of the own price elasticity,
that is here equal to α pi (1 − si).
Equations (2)–(5)–(8) constitute the econometric model to be estimated.
3.2 Estimation
The model, which contains twenty parameters, is estimated by means of non-
linear three-stage least squares implemented with the procedure MODEL of
the SAS software.7 It is fitted on a data set covering the period 2000–3 for
reasons explained in para. 2.5. Given that there are thirteen significant firms
and four years of data, this provides fifty-two observations. As we use the risk
level lagged once in the list of exogenous variables, we use the year 1999 for
defining the initial conditions. The procedure requires the use of instrumental
variables. The set of instruments we have selected contains all exogenous
variables as well as the market share and the price lagged once.
Estimation results are gathered in Table 12.2. We report only the most
relevant parameters that impact on the simulations. Most parameters are
Table 12.2 Estimation results
Variable name Parameter Parameter estimate t-value 1st stage R2
Cost equation Constant 0 −160.3250 −0.02 1.00
Number of policies 1 0.2450 16.14 0.95
Nb policies * Nb offices 2 −0.0003 −2.34 0.97
Demand equation Constant 0 6.1397 5.87 1.00
Number of offices 1 −0.0028 −0.77 1.00
Risk level lagged 2 −2.6449 −1.18 1.00
Marginal utility of income
Constant 0 38.1296 5.33 0.66
GDP 1 −0.1728 −5.12 0.74
7 3SLS is an instrumental variables technique that simultaneously estimates all three equations.
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significant. The relatively high level of the first-stage coefficient of determina-
tion for the parameters of interest α0 and α1 indicates that they are relatively
well identified by our set of instruments. Note that the effect of the number of
offices is not significant on the quality index but it is strongly significant on the
marginal cost. Although statistically insignificant, the estimate for the para-
meter associated with the lagged risk level and the estimated value for the
marginal utility of income (parameter α) have the expected sign which should
be viewed as the signal of an economically meaningful model.
3.3 Discussion
Table 12.3a gathers estimates for different characteristics of insurance firms.
First the own- and cross-price elasticities are relatively high. These numbers
suggest that the market is competitive and that insurance firms are perceived
as substitutes by their customers. Second, the cost function of insurance firms
exhibits increasing returns to scale. The average cost function is much flatter
than the marginal cost function and the ratio of average to marginal costs (a
standard measure of returns to scale) is substantially above one. Note that the
estimated marginal costs range from 0.11 to 0.23, that is to say, almost double
among firms, while the range of average costs spreads over the interval
between 0.16 and 0.26. A 1 per cent increase in the number of policies
(which corresponds to 7,750 policies on average) decreases the average cost
Table 12.3a Estimated characteristics of insurance groups
Firm
Own price
Elasticity
Cross-price
Elasticity
Marginal
Cost
Average
Cost
Return
to Scale
Quality
Index
A −3.43 0.31 0.16 0.21 1.39 5.58
B −3.24 0.06 0.13 0.19 1.45 3.42
C −3.85 0.39 0.19 0.24 1.33 6.06
D −3.68 0.68 0.18 0.24 1.47 6.49
E −2.78 0.12 0.11 0.16 1.49 4.05
F −3.54 0.39 0.16 0.24 1.47 5.78
G −2.51 0.85 0.12 0.20 1.66 6.30
H −3.64 0.05 0.15 0.23 1.51 3.48
I −3.29 0.12 0.14 0.21 1.55 4.31
J −4.41 0.10 0.20 0.24 1.19 4.90
K −3.52 0.09 0.15 0.18 1.23 4.07
L −4.54 0.06 0.23 0.24 1.23 4.02
M −4.39 0.25 0.21 0.26 1.22 5.88
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by only 0.001 per cent. However, a 1 per cent increase in the number of offices
brings a 0.2 per cent fall in the marginal cost. This result shows that, although
economies of scale are not negligible, economies of density due to a network
effect are much more powerful.
Table 12.3a also shows that B has the second lowest marginal costs among
insurance companies and both B and A have relatively high-quality index,
indicating a high level of loyalty and trust of their customers.
Table 12.3b compares the estimatedmarkups of some firms (i.e. substituting
our estimated parameters into equation 8) to the actual ratios of premia to
claims. These ratios could be considered as accounting markups. Note that the
econometric model underestimates the markups, although the differences are
relatively small for the largest companies.
4. Merger analysis
The model serves as a tool to simulate the notified merger between B and A. If
all customers of A and B stay with their insurers after the merger, then one can
predict a very high price if competitors do not react, i.e. keep the same prices.
It is not a sustainable situation. One reasonably expects that some customers
of B and A would switch to other insurance companies and that the latter
would change their prices following the merger. Hence it is required to
simulate the new Bertrand–Nash equilibrium after merger, as if all customers
Table 12.3b Estimated versus observed markups
Firm Estimated markup Accounting markup
A 29.97 31.16
B 31.40 49.05
C 26.54 33.32
D 30.89 25.54
E 36.80 32.98
F 28.57 27.44
G 40.08 26.84
H 27.54 42.23
I 31.47 42.83
J 22.79 51.98
K 28.51 43.51
L 22.39 50.33
M 22.87 29.18
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re-compute their optimal choice of insurance. We also need to consider what
happens to costs. The first simulation (Table 12.4a) assumes efficiency gains in
the sense that B, by acquiring all offices of A while maintaining the structure of
its marginal cost function, can decrease the level of marginal costs. On the
basis of the estimated model, it turns out the average premium of B’s policies
would increase by 1.6 per cent and the average premium of A’s policies would
increase by 5.2 per cent. Table 12.4a provides the results of the simulated
equilibrium after merger. Note that, because of the endogeneity of marginal
costs, these are different before and after merger. Using a bootstrap method,
we show that neither of these price rises is significantly different from zero
because the bootstrapped confidence interval always contains zero.
If there were nomerger specific efficiency gains, the price increases would
be much higher (see Table 12.4b). The new entity would then lose sub-
stantial market share. However, unlike many potential sources of efficiency
gain that might be claimed, our assumed source is an existing network so
the source of the efficiency is tangible, not speculative. Also, it could not be
achieved in the absence of the merger.8 Thus, the Table 12.4a results are
more appropriate.
Consider again the results with efficiency gains in Table 12.4a. Note that each
firm increases its price after merger by a non-negligible per cent. It is the sign
that, at the present time, the insurance industry is far from the equilibrium. One
Table 12.4a Simulated effects of the notified merger (with efficiency gains)
Quality
Index
Marginal
Cost
Pre-merger
Price
Post-merger
Price
Change In
price
Pre-merger
Margin
Post-merger
Margin
A 6.30 0.21 0.28 0.28 0.86% 26% 26%
B 4.17 0.14 0.21 0.21 0.39% 33% 33%
C 5.99 0.17 0.25 0.25 1.19% 30% 30%
D 6.44 0.14 0.22 0.23 5.21% 37% 40%
E 4.48 0.12 0.19 0.19 0.76% 36% 37%
F 6.17 0.19 0.26 0.27 0.99% 27% 28%
G 6.84 0.14 0.23 0.23 1.61% 39% 40%
H 4.48 0.14 0.21 0.21 0.54% 33% 33%
I 5.17 0.21 0.28 0.28 0.28% 25% 25%
J 5.79 0.29 0.36 0.36 0.12% 19% 19%
K 6.38 0.22 0.29 0.29 0.78% 25% 25%
8 In other words, we do not includemerger specific efficiency gains. The efficiency gains are just the normal
gains due to the cost structure we have estimated for this industry.
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should expect more consolidations and/or more adjustment in terms of pricing
and marketing strategies. Meanwhile, the relatively high market share of the
merged entity B/A raises legitimate concerns.
5. Conclusions
The econometric modelling of the insurance market pre-merger provides a
quantification of some of the key issues in merger analysis. In the present case,
we can highlight four such issues. First, B and A have the highest levels of
attractiveness as measured by our quality index, but other firms are not
lagging far behind. We interpret these results as showing the combined effect
of reputation or aggressiveness of firms and/or loyalty of customers. Second,
own-price elasticities are high, with an overall level of 3.6 per cent. Cross-price
elasticities are smaller, with an overall level of 0.3 per cent. These numbers
suggest that the market is competitive and that possibilities of substitution
among firms are high. Third, when ranking marginal costs by increasing
order, B arrives the second, while A is among the last firms. The estimated
marginal costs double between the lowest and highest values. Fourth, the cost
function exhibits increasing returns to scale. There is not much saving on cost
due to an increase in the number of contracts administered by a single firm.
Indeed the average cost is roughly flat as an increase of 1 per cent in the
number of policies. However, there is a non-negligible network effect.
Table 12.4b Simulated effects of the notified merger (without efficiency gains)
Quality
Index
Marginal
Cost
Pre-merger
Price
Post-merger
Price
Change In
price
Pre-merger
Margin
Post-merger
Margin
A 6.30 0.21 0.28 0.28 1% 26% 27%
B 4.17 0.14 0.21 0.21 1% 33% 33%
C 5.99 0.17 0.25 0.25 2% 30% 31%
D 6.44 0.14 0.22 0.28 26% 37% 29%
E 4.48 0.12 0.19 0.19 1% 36% 37%
F 6.17 0.19 0.26 0.27 2% 27% 28%
G 6.84 0.14 0.23 0.28 22% 39% 29%
H 4.48 0.14 0.21 0.21 1% 33% 34%
I 5.17 0.21 0.28 0.28 0% 25% 25%
J 5.79 0.29 0.36 0.36 0% 19% 19%
K 6.38 0.22 0.29 0.29 1% 25% 26%
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Using these findings to examine the effects of the proposed merger once
consumers and firms have had time to adjust, it turns out the average
premium of B’s policies would increase by 1.6 per cent and the average
premium of A’s policies would increase by 5.2 per cent. Neither of these
price rises is significantly different from zero. These results favour an approval
of the merger
However, in the very short run, the relatively highmarket share of the entity
B/A raises legitimate concerns because it takes time before customers are able
to adapt their decisions, even if the transaction costs incurred when changing
from an insurer to another are not so high. In order to facilitate the conver-
gence of the industry to a new equilibrium, several actions could be applied.
First, transparency of the merger should be enforced. In particular B’s and A’s
customers should be informed of the operation, the business model chosen by
the stakeholders and the consequences in terms of prices and offers. This
situation calls for an involvement of the regulator of this industry which is able
to monitor and to enforce the transparency of the operation. Second, given
that B is cost-efficient, B might be forced to sell some of A’s local area offices,
in particular where competitors are weakly represented. Although this would
involve some costs, it might be compensated by the increased degree of
competition. However, a proper appraisal of this type of remedy would
require further investigation and additional data.
Finally, in the longer term, the possibility of an investigation for abuse of
dominant position if needed constitutes the Sword of Damocles above the
merging entity.
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